

HERALD
OF THE
KINGDOM AND AGE TO COME.

“And in their days, even of those kings, the Eloah of the heavens shall set up a KINGDOM that shall not be abolished FOR AGES, and a DOMINION that shall not be left to another people. It shall grind to powder and bring to an end all these kingdoms, and itself shall stand FOR AGES.”—DANIEL.

JOHN THOMAS, Editor. West Hoboken, Hudson Co., N.J., MAY, 1861
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Postage of Eureka.

Before EUREKA, was put into the hands of the printer, it was possible only to guess at the amount of the postage. The postage of books is determined by their weight, which, of course, cannot be ascertained before the book is bound. On the supposition that EUREKA would not weigh more than ELPIS ISRAEL, we advertised its postage as the same. But since EUREKA has been finished, we have found that it weighs *six ounces* more than ELPIS ISRAEL; and that the postage, consequently, is THIRTY CENTS instead of twenty-four, which is at the rate of a cent an ounce to any distance under 3000 miles, so long as the ORIGINAL UNCLE SAM continues to be the mail carrier in SECESSIONDOM. When his contract expires, and KING COTTON undertakes to make his post-office self-supporting, postal rates will be increased; but till then the price of a single copy of Eureka, *including postage*, will be \$2.30.

For all subscribers who forwarded us twenty-four cents for postage we have paid the additional six cents, which has caused a deficit to us of about \$7.00 on the whole. We do not ask them to refund this; but we mention it, that, if any more copies are required by mail, our friends may be careful to send us the extra six cents, —that is, thirty cents instead of twenty-four; for, though six cents are a small affair in themselves, they make up a considerable sum when oft repeated.

April 10, 1861.

EDITOR

On Immortality.

NO. III.

BY W. D. JARDINE.

Respected Brother: —Referring to our last letter on Butler's 1st chapter of his analogy, we beg to resume our argument. To many of your readers it will doubtless be both irksome and unprofitable, considering the scriptures as the only book worthy of serious attention, and we sympathize with them, but nevertheless solicit their forbearance for the reason that our argument may prove useful in tending to remove a prejudice which generally obtains among those who are readers of Butler, fostered, no doubt, by the fact that his analogy is considered

indispensable to a complete course of theological instruction, and *that* not simply as a class-book fitted for the discipline of the mind, but as one of those vastly esteemed books among the clergy which belong to the "external evidences" of their view of a divine revelation. The prejudice we refer to springs from an opinion that Butler cannot be assailed on his own ground, and hence if he cannot be assailed there, the interpretations of scripture in harmony with his analogy cannot be gainsayed. This conclusion is just enough, but that on which it is based happens to be worthless. Butler is vulnerable despite his subtlety, and it is to aid the few to this opinion we write—to aid them to satisfy themselves of the fallacy of the Bishop's reasoning, *if it be* they are earnestly desirous of examining the subject with the indifference to results which marks the spirit of true philosophy—excluding all prejudices, regardless of all consequences. Our strictures to some may not be satisfactory, this we cannot help—there are some people it is impossible to satisfy—and to most readers they may appear lengthy, and therefore tedious, but we have required to do so to follow the argument throughout, and believing it to be a good work, and hoping it will accomplish that for which we desire to publish it, we again proceed.

When Galileo turned his telescope to an examination of the heavens, he had no conception of what he would see by its means, and was therefore without any consciousness of the extent of the power which this instrument would add to his eyesight. "It was then that, to his unutterable astonishment, he saw the surface of the moon like another planet, ridged by high mountains and furrowed by deep valleys," etc., etc. He was not conscious of having such a power by this aid until he put his eye to the glass, until he fixed as it were another organ to his body; and why? because the power lay in the instrument. He had no power else to perceive the same things except through the telescope; and after he had experienced the power he begat an increase of consciousness in relation to what he saw. Now were the telescope irretrievably destroyed, this consciousness would gradually diminish with the remoteness of the incident, until extinct. "Wisdom at one entrance would be quite shut out," and the knowledge of which this powerful instrument is the medium, would decay; the worlds, in the immensity of space which it telegraphs, would be as though they were not, and the field of thought bounded by a narrower line. And we must not forget that this might happen with *all* that we do know, and therefore think about. Knowledge, like the ocean, is continually evaporating, and, unless as continually added to, would soon dry up. What then? if we destroy the telescope and microscope, we destroy inevitably the power of the soul to find the knowledge which these instruments convey. And so, too, if all the entrances were shut up, destroyed, every thing would be as it were not; there would be no consciousness of anything, and hence no mind, no reason, and a soul without reason is *no soul*, at least it is not a living soul. Now, says Butler, "our finding that the dissolution of matter in which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution, and the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of perception and motion belonging to them is not their destruction, shows demonstratively that there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs or instruments will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death." See pages 35-and 36. But what we have said leads to a contrary "finding," since we find that the destruction of the microscope and telescope destroys the power to see beyond the naked eye, the destruction of the eye destroys the power to see at all, the want of an organ necessitates the want of *the* experience relating to it, and the want of this experience is a deficit in the bulk of our consciousness, and so the destruction of all the organs is the annihilation of all the senses, without which man as a sentient being is dead indeed, as we have no reason to think we stand in a different kind of relation to all the

ordinary organs of our body from that which we stand to those extraordinary organs which are at our option, the use or non-use of which expands or diminishes the consciousness.

The "living power" which Butler, in his argument, would here force upon our attention, is a something indiminishable without a fact to prove it so; but as we experience the contrary in our use and non-use of our living powers, we must hold the facts against such a presumption.

To repeat them, —

It is in accordance with experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, even the greatest part of their bodies, and yet remain living agents.

It is contrary to experience that men born, their bodies being imperfect, have a consciousness the same in degree as those possess whose bodies are perfect.

It is in accordance with experience, that what is acquired is never retained without repeated addition thereto; hence, whatever of consciousness these last have more than those who never had the use of their limbs or organs of sense, must, in the case of loss by accident, ultimately diminish to the ratio of the organic power they enjoy, and change them from the "living agents" they were, to agents as different as their bodies differ from what they once were. "And" *so also*, (see page 33 of Butler,) "as persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small in comparison of what it is in mature age," we can say they can likewise trace up to a time when the "bulk" of their consciousness was as small in comparison with what it is in maturity. "And we cannot but think that they might have then lost a considerable part of that small body," and have lived to experience a consciousness as different in degree from other men as their bodies would be different. "And as it is certain that the bodies of all animals are in a constant state of flux from that never-ceasing attrition which there is in every part of them," and as it is equally certain the animal organs do not remain the same throughout the processes of growth and decay, and that consciousness depends, *i. e.*, exists, grows, and decays along with the organic structure, we are clearly taught not to separate that which is manifestly joined together, inasmuch as we have the same kind of experience that our consciousness changes as that our body changes. We do not perceive the processes of growth and decay in the one more than in the other, but we experience the effects in a larger body, in an increased consciousness—in a defective body, in a limited consciousness. The consciousness of a child is not that of a man any more than its body, and the consciousness of dotage is not that of youth. Hence, as we have reason and experience to say that death is the destruction of the body, we have an equal amount of reason and experience to say it is also the destruction of consciousness. And since, according to Butler, it is the inherent quality of his "living power," what is said of the one *must* be said of the other. The *strength* of Butler's argument here lies wholly in *the assumption* that consciousness is single and indivisible—*an element*. But this assumption *hath no proof* it cannot be demonstrated; and therefore, as consciousness is absolutely necessary to man *as a conscious being*, the strength of *our* argument over Butler's lies in the definition we have given of it, and the demonstration we have shown. Our definition *that it is a sense the result of the integral combination of varied organic effort, as any sense is the result of a fraction of that effort*, is as legitimate an assumption as another, and though it is not that which is recognized in what is called "philosophy," what of that? in the face of *no proof*. The evidence we have supported our definition with is irrefragable, and cannot be explained on the supposition that consciousness is single and indivisible, and independent of organic effort.

Consequently, to follow the reasoning of Butler, (see page 32 of Anal.) that the subject in which consciousness resides must partake of its character, *i e.*, if single and indivisible he must be so also, or if compound, he likewise—so consciousness, as we have defined it and illustrated it in this and preceding letters, must make the being to whom it is an absolute necessity, compound and destructible as itself is, and so “all presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings must go upon supposition that they are compound and so discernible,” *the point* as regards consciousness from which we started. To some it may appear we have not demonstrated more than Butler; but, granting this, if "there appears upon the whole any the lowest presumption, though in the lowest degree greater, this determines the question" between us, as to the probability man is mortal or immortal; and if it be *seen*, that on the whole there is only *an equal* presumption, this still materially affects the object for which the Bishop undertook the subject, his reasonings fall short of weight, his probabilities are met by other, probabilities, *and so what avails this presumption of his for a future life as any reason to anticipate it?*

We turn now to what is called the higher life of man—the intellectual, as distinguished from the sensual. Butler remarks, (page 36,) "That as 'tis evident our present powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection do not depend on our gross body, in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does, so they do not appear to depend on it all in any such manner as to give ground to think that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation, or to give ground to conclude even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former." To this we have to say, it is not evident "our present powers of reason," etc., "do not depend on our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does." Again, on page 37, he proceeds: "From our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, levers, and scaffolds are in architecture. Yet, when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses, and without any at all which we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death." The momentum of a moving body is a force abstractly considered, something distinct from the original motion; yet it participates of the same nature with it, and like it ceases to exist. If sensation from external causes is the setter in motion of our ideas, as Butler shows, does it follow necessarily, or even presumptively, that the faculty of abstraction, that is, "the capability of reflecting, in the most intense degree, without any" apparent "assistance from our senses," etc., as in the above quotation? does it follow, even presumptively, that this faculty will not cease when the assistance of our senses is withdrawn? Archbishop Whately, in his *Easy Lessons on Reasoning*, page 524, fourth edition, presents a decisive answer to this question. He says (we abridge) "The faculty of language is an instrument of reasoning by which, in the ready exercise of our abstraction, signs (or common terms) are used. For there can be no syllogism without a common term. Accordingly, a deaf-mute, before he has been taught the language—either the finger language or reading—cannot carry on a train of reasoning more than a brute. This a deaf mute can answer to. The signs, (common terms) as distinct from language, considered as a mode of communication. such as we see manifested in the lower animals which exhibits nothing more than the semblance of reason—something like it—the signs, common terms, need not be addressed to the ear. The signs of the numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., have no necessary connection with sound, but are equally understood by the English, French, and Dutch, whose spoken languages are quite different. And the whole written language of the Chinese is of this kind. In the different provinces of China, they speak different dialects; but all read the same characters, each of which (like the figures 1, 2, 3, 4) has a sense

independent of the sound; and to the deaf mutes it must be so with all kinds of language understood by them, whether common writing or the finger language. The case of one Laura Bridgeman, in America, who has been from birth not only deaf and dumb, but also blind, presents a notable instance as bearing on this subject. She has been taught the finger language, to read what is printed in raised characters, and also to write. When she is alone her fingers are generally observed to be moving, though the signs are so slight and imperfect that others cannot make out what she is thinking of. But if they inquire of her she will tell them. It seems that, having once learned the use of signs, she finds the necessity of them as an instrument of thought, when thinking of anything beyond mere objects of sense. And, doubtless, every one else does the same; though in our case no one can, as in this case, see the operation; nor in general can it be heard, though some few persons have a habit of occasionally 'thinking aloud,' as it is called. But the signs we use in silent reflection are merely mental conceptions of uttered words, and these, doubtless, are such as could hardly be understood by another, even if uttered audibly. For we think in a kind of shorthand, if one may use the expression, like the notes one takes down to help the memory, which consist of a word or two, or even a letter, to suggest a whole sentence; so that such notes would be unintelligible to any one else. It has been observed also, that this person, when asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has her fingers frequently in motion, being in fact talking in her sleep, *i.e.*, thinking by language, speaking mentally; she used outward signs, we inward ones." Now this illustration is important, as an instance of mind depending on one sense, and that not on one generally connected with ordinary mental manifestation, by which our attention being drawn to one particular channel, in which operations are clearly observable, we are enabled to perceive and judge the more clearly the mode of operation in mental phenomena. And our judgment suggests the questions, Had the girl lost her fingers, would she have retained the impressions she had received through them, to which she, while in possession of them, was ever adding. No. They would disappear gradually, as the distance of the event of her loss would increase. And had she never had her fingers, and no other means available for her education, in how much would she have distinguished herself from the brutes? We have what are called idiots in the world, and the reason why, may be given in the presumption, that no endeavor has been made, or man has failed to find a method, or that some are irremediable, beyond the power of man, to educate them, to teach them "common terms." An institution for this purpose exists in France, and success in several instances has been obtained. In such efforts then, and in the case of Laura Bridgeman, we have the mind formed by things from without acting mutually with sensation; and as this sensation originates with the nervous system, by means of organs in connection with the external world, the external world becomes as necessary for the mind as for the body. Hence, withdraw from man sensation, and his life is virtually suspended, it descends to the level of the vegetable process; withdraw from him the world, and the result is equally the same, his mind becomes a blank. If we see no signs of life about a man, we have no reason to say he is alive; and as little reason have we to say he has a soul, if we see no soul-manifestation about him. If one cannot reason, or in simpler terms think, what evidence is there of mind? What else do we see but a vacant stare? But set the power of education a-moving, and then thought begins. Ideas are impressed; that is, signs of things without are photographed, or put up in type, by means of the senses, in the sensorium, and from thence abstraction is conceived. Previous to the impression made there is no thought. In the absence of impressions there must, of necessity, be no thoughts. The progress the mind makes with education, and the decay it evinces in the neglect of it, prove this. The results of training in the cure of idiocy, and the instance of Laura Bridgeman, fully illustrate it. Now, were the soul of man something immortal, something living independent of the body, and acting all along upon the world, instead, of the world acting upon it, we should expect at least a continual progress from good to better, from a state of foetal unconsciousness and impotency, to a state

of increased and increasing susceptibility and capability, despite of external obstacles. We should expect it to find ways and means of discovering itself as a living agent, independent of language, and of the defects of physical organization. Far removed as the person of God is from the ken of man, do not his works display him? but what have we to prove to us there is an immortal soul, partaking, it is said, of the divine essence in the deaf-mute, or in the idiot, whose persons are beside us? We hear not the voice of God, but we see the operations of his reason notwithstanding; we know from his works that he is an intelligent being; and by parity of reason we ask for some such proof of an immortal soul in him who is bereft of the ordinary modes of manifesting intelligence. We hear not, we see not, and we feel not the language of the mute who has neither tongue, finger, sign, nor gesture, moving though he does in the midst of us, what other evidence have we then that he has got a soul, either intelligent or immortal? And we must not forget there are some born idiots, and others become idiots, aye, after they have been educated, in which state, the state of idiocy they are, as if they had been born idiots without any thing in themselves to mark the learning they had once acquired. From these statements, then, we have a presumption, that if man's soul, that is, his mind in the highest sense, partook in part however small that part might be, of the divine essence, he should partake also, in an equal degree in like circumstances, of discovering itself in a trace of mental operation, distinguishable from the brutes. We don't know God from a knowledge of his person; he reveals himself to us independent of personal manifestation; why cannot the soul, said to be in man, and independent of his organization, reveal itself likewise? especially in such cases in which were even a trace noticeable of such a thing, it would reward the labour, hard as it might be, of the loving relative to find it. But as we can find no such trace, even to an infinitesimal amount, and as it accords with our experience, that a letter precedes a word, and a word a syllogism, and these language, and this the instrument of the mind's operation, by which abstraction is carried on, it follows, naturally, that on the withdrawal of this instrument the thoughts perish, and hence the soul of man of which they are the inherent quality. "Aye, but this does not necessarily follow," says one, "the instrument and the person who uses the instrument are separate and distinct." True, but if the instrument is necessary to the person what then? If the instrument is necessary to the musician to make him what he *is*, does he continue a musician after his instrument is destroyed? If education is not available does thought take place? If the brain is destroyed, what then? If we look through a telescope is it the telescope that sees? Is it the eye that sees? Is it education that thinks? What then sees, thinks, etc.? Is it the soul? the spirit that is said to be capable of being disembodied that sees, etc.? How can it see? what experience have we of this soul acting in any manner without instruments, why infer that it can? We reason that as it cannot act without organs, it cannot live without a body, and therefore there is not such a soul in man of which it can be said in a pre-eminent sense "it sees, it thinks, etc. What then sees? It is the man in the integrity of his combined nature. Does this solve the problem or remove a difficulty towards the solution? It is a reasonable answer in accordance with our common experience which cannot be said by the assertion, "it is the soul that sees, etc." He who asserts this must show proof after what has been said. The burden of proof lies wholly with him, and the difficulty too, whatever there is of it. He may say "mind must precede matter," but what is matter; can any one tell? It is not enough to say "it is something that does not think," since we have no demonstration of any thing out of matter that *does* think. Then "God is matter." He is not unthinking matter. "But how can matter think?" with more reason let it be asked, how that which is *not* matter can think? The *how* of any thing cannot be explained, since every cause has its pre-existing cause, until we reach the great cause of all, *God*. But reasoning from what we *do* know, certainly that is to be respected, the most which least appears absurd. Of how God exists, acts, thinks we know and can know nothing, but reason teaches us that *he is a person*, else he would not be a God, as he is experienced to be. His person and mind coexist, and that he *is* as we have said,

is to say that he is as he ever has been. His person means possession of a personal manifestation, as his mind means the possession of a mental manifestation. This personal manifestation then must imply substance, and this substance, *matter*. And again, what is matter? This we don't know, yet we know something about it. But were it possible that God had existed in some particular sense previous to his person, or for God to exist in some particular sense independent of his person—were it possible we say to conceive of such an absurdity existing, such would not be any reason for regarding man's soul as therefore immortal, and so forth. The immeasurable height of the one above the other, the self-existence of the one, the dependent existence of the other, the eternity of the one, the beginning of the other, and our experience of both, forbid the conclusion. Between God and man there is no comparison. Man is a creation, God is not. Even though mind could exist without matter, it is certain matter *preceded* man's mind. Still we cannot here reason from man to God, from the least to the greatest, from the creature to the creator. God's ways are not as man's ways, nor his thoughts man's thoughts, and this aside from moral character. God's mind is so inconceivably above man's mind, that we cannot imagine it to be mind at all after the fashion of the physiology and anatomy of man's mind, though there is *so* much of a similarity between them. And so of matter as it exists around us, from what we know of it: it is eternal in its elements, unchangeable in its forces, and these are qualities analogous to those of the being of God; but it no more follows that this matter—the matter which we feel and act upon—is therefore God, any more than the mind of man is identical, even in the smallest degree, with the mind of God. But as eternity of matter and eternity of God imply coexistence, this coexistence, coupled with our experience of the personality of God, is an inference, and a strong one, for a mutual dependence. We are here, as it were, prying into what may seem beyond the legitimate boundary of our reason, and vainly giving an explanation of the creator "whom no man hath seen or can see," and therefore of whom we can know little beyond what is revealed by himself; but we have not done so without invitation, seeing others assuming that God is a spirit *immaterial*. What reason have they for asserting this? and, independent of matter, affirm that the soul—"a particle of the divine essence," say they—is immaterial also, is independent of the body, is immortal, as if the creature must of necessity mirror the attributes of the creator, as if the clay in the hands of the potter must partake in part of the potter's character? Returning then to the question what sees, etc.? we reply again: It is not what is called the soul, it is not what is called the spirit, nor what is called the body; *it is man in the integrity of his combined nature*, and when this combined nature of his is broken up, he ceases to exist, and his thoughts perish.

But then, another thing appears to oppose this conclusion, namely, *the distinction between mental and physical phenomena in their full developments*. The difference seems wide, but notwithstanding—singular as thought looks beside sensation, mental operation beside physical operation—the more minutely we examine each in its growth and decay, the narrower the line of demarcation becomes. The difference manifested is no proof that a like difference obtains with the beginning and the ending of each. Variety in organic structure does not necessarily imply difference in origin, nor demand different processes of development, even though the objects of existence may differ as in the several varieties of organic life. The vegetable process differs from the animal process, but in all animals and in all vegetables there is similarity of origin, and in the several species of each genus.

It is therefore no marvel for man from the superiority of his form, structure, and pursuit in life to develop a superior order of phenomena to any thing of the kind around him, but it certainly would be marvellous were he to manifest two lives, the one independent of the other. He would be an exception among the creatures of God; he would have one life more

than the creator himself; or we should be forced to explain all things differently from what we are accustomed, give every thought a soul, every force in creation a person, and assign to everything which affects our several senses a separate origin and independent being. Fruit and flowers, for example, which are as different from the plants which yield them, as their taste and smell—other examples—are from their form and beauty, and these all are separate and distinguishable manifestations of the same plant, as separate and as distinguishable from one another as mental phenomena from physical phenomena, and as instinct from both. And taking abstraction as the highest and most singular part in the mind's development, what is there in it to cause a doubt as to our conclusion, *the mind's destruction*. Both mental and physical phenomena are exhibited in the ratio of perfect organization in adaptation with perfect provision. The means to excite a sensation are as necessary as the organ with which the sensation originates. Withdraw the means; and the organ ceases its functions, and to say that the organ will continue to exist after this, is to say that God will suffer, or nature, if you will, will suffer a useless thing to exist, which is contrary to experience. Withdraw the means, we say, and the function ceases, the effect ceases, —the sensation, or, call it what you will, thought, —consciousness, or in the aggregate, soul or mind. We admit there does *seem* in abstraction something like the withdrawal of means, but it does not follow that it is in reality so. All things are not as they seem to be, whether in heaven or in earth. Cut down a tree in its prime, and let us cut it off from the root which draws its nourishment from the soil—let the trunk lie where it has fallen, and if it be in the eve of winter, true to its nature when the spring comes, it (we don't speak of the root, we speak of the trunk) will shoot forth its leaves notwithstanding—but how long? There is a seeming abstraction here, from its means of provision. An animal continues to live for a time without eating, and may be far enough away from external nourishment, yet it lives. And what is there more marvellous in a man's thinking? With the tree we have the natural sap, as long as it lasts, of the trunk as an instrument of life by manifestation there. With the animal we have its stomach as the means by which it can live, in the apparent absence of food. And with man we have language in the shape of finger signs to the mute, and of "mental conceptions of uttered words " to others—photographical impressions of things without, with which thought in the apparent absence of external agency is carried on. If language, then, by which we mean signs of things external to us, in whatever way these signs maybe written or impressed, —if language then is so necessary to abstract thought, and this thought so distinguishing a feature of the soul of man, we think that if this soul were immortal it should retain all its functions in full vigor, despite of accidents of the encroachment of time, and of those diseases which end in death. Butler's argument is, *that it does so* in certain diseases which end in death, and so concludes it is beyond their reach. He stakes, as it were, his belief of immortality of the soul upon the manifestations which it gives of its functional power while surrounded by physical derangement. What he calls its manifestations of immortality are his proofs. We will examine these proofs, therefore, and see wherein their boasted strength lies. And let it be remembered, again, that in this examination "if there appears upon the whole any, the lowest presumption, though in the lowest degree greater" on our side of the argument, this determines the question between us. We have said that "we think if the soul were immortal it should retain all its functions in full vigor throughout those diseases which end in death." We have said after this, giving instances in which it does not manifest any existence at all. It will be observed, therefore, that the manifestation we seek for is not something out of place; that our expectation of such a thing, from the consideration of the soul being immortal, is reasonable, seeing Butler not only looks for the same thing, but presumes he has hit upon the very manifestations desired. "Instances of mortal diseases" says he, page 37, "not" impairing our present reflecting powers evidently turn our thoughts from imagining such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things greatly affect our living powers, and at length suspend the

exercise of them—as for instance, drowsiness, increasing until it ends in sleep, and from thence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as the shadow of probability to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we have at present; for in these diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life—they discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire, with the utmost force of affection, sense of character, shame and honour, and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings even to the last gasp—and these surely prove greater vigour of life than bodily strength does. Now, what pretence is there for thinking that progressive disease when arrived to such a degree which is mortal, will destroy those powers which were not impaired, which were not affected by it during its whole progress quite up to that degree. And if death by disease of this kind is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers 'twill scarce be thought that death by any other means is." Now, there is no true analogy here. Between things natural, and unnatural there is nothing in common. Unnatural death is a distorted mirror of what death is naturally, of how it affects the body and mind. Death is a process as well as life. It is not something effected at once, but has its development in decay. We speak of natural death in man, of the natural process in common with the natural course of his life; and were we to cite an instance like as Butler cites instances of disease ending in death, of how the powers of mind may not really be affected thereby, we might with equal reason illustrate by the same method how the powers of the body also may not be affected thereby. A man possesses his reason entire up to the moment a musket ball enters his heart, and as this may be a presumption that these powers continue unabated after death, it is equally presumptive to say his bodily powers exist also, since death removes the object from our view, and we have no sensible proof to the contrary. To this an objection will start at once, but examine the nature of it, and it will be perceived as equally applicable to Butler's instances of diseases ending in death. For, as there are few die naturally—probably nine tenths of the human race are cut off by poison from innumerable sources, by war, and accident, and therefore in the state of mind in these circumstances there is nothing in common with natural death, more than there is any thing in common with the power of the body in death by a gun shot, and in death the result of natural decay. And turning to the instances advanced by Butler we see nothing even from his own point of view to justify his conclusion that the powers of the mind are not impaired by the progressive operation of those mortal diseases, "up to the point of death." "In such cases," says the Bishop "persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life"—referring to the mind "Well, suppose they do "appear;" it does not follow they are. What is disease? It is the derangement of one or more organs of the body, and it is an established opinion that the derangement in one organ will, by a power in nature stimulate other organs to perform their functions with greater force, so as to remove through an extraordinary sympathetic action the cause of the derangement. This is exemplified in the unnatural symptoms which diseases manifest, and these manifestations are followed by a depression of mind and weakness of body in the event of convalescence, or by entire prostration in the event of death. Now, that the body should show an unnatural excitement at times, as in fever, and exhibit superhuman strength as delirium during progress of disease is quite as justifiable a reason to suppose that these diseases do not impair the powers of the body, any more than those of which Butler speaks, impair the powers of the mind. For, as in the instances he points to "persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life," so in the other cases in the event of death, persons the moment before manifest the greatest physical strength. In this, however, common sense forbids the conclusion, while in that false philosophy bolsters up a conceit. True indeed, "several things, greatly affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them—as for instance, drowziness increasing until it ends in sleep; and from hence we might

have imagined it would destroy them till we found by experience, the weakness of this way of judging." Yes, truly, our awakening saves the inference—and so our reason and experience in the event of convalescence from disease, in which all our living powers were greatly affected, and apparently augmented forbid the conclusion that in such diseases our powers of body and mind are not impaired thereby, and expose "the weakness of this" (Bishop's) "way of judging." Every man is cognizant of the effects of tea, coffee, tobacco, alcohol, opium on the "spirits." Calmness, cheerfulness, hilarity, melancholy, acute perception, and religious feelings are no uncommon manifestations in even the moderate indulgence of any of these stimuli. And so natural-like do those phenomena sometimes appear, that they induce many to think themselves improved thereby. But no correct observer will admit those effects as good, even though in the case of the religious effect on the feelings should dispose itself in praise and prayer, or even though the perceptive power be sharpened to solve the easier a difficult problem, since when the effects of the stimulus have vanished, the one feels "flat as a flounder," the other as irritable as a devil. *Instances of the religious element, and we speak of this particularly as it is the oftener taken as a criterion of mental advancement, and made a show of as an indisputable evidence in the approach of death of the soul's immortality, than any thing else*—instances of the religious element taking no small part in the exhibition of the mental aberration of intoxication can be met with any day. One reveals it in this state, in weeping over her sins, and in praying for forgiveness, things which in her sober moments she ne'er would think of—another in a calm, cheerful expectation of getting into heaven, on the ground of being "friends with everybody"—a third in a much speaking about doing good and exhorting others to be good. Such like exhibitions of the effects of intoxication are known to many. We have noticed it repeatedly, there is nothing strange about it more than there is in any other exhibition of the same kind in which the opposite of religious feeling may be shown. Shakespeare very lucidly portrays it in his Othello, see Cassio's colloquy with the villain Iago who entraps him, in his cups. "Well, heavens above all," says Cassio, drunk, "and there be souls that must be saved, and there be souls that must not be saved—I hope to be saved. Forgive us our sins! Do not think, gentlemen, I am drunk." This is no fancy sketch of Shakespeare's, it is what obtains often. And in certain "Revival" meetings we have similar exhibitions of the same religious feeling arising from excitements as equally pernicious as the drink. And as the effect has a pious-like, good-like, and therefore to some a most attractive aspect are we to pass over the cause, on the principle of doing evil that good may come, nay, of doing something more, of perpetrating a folly to secure for a moment a pious thought. Are we to presume, that these exhibitions of religious feelings which arise from no principle, but mere excitement, whether from drink or from phreno-magnetic influence, or other stimuli—are evidences of mental power, and not evidences of mental weakness? certainly not—they are indisputably evidences of mental weakness, and more, they are the unmistakable effects of poison on the body, and therefore disease in a limited and transient manifestation. That therefore other diseases incident to man should effect similar results in a more permanent form is very probable, nay even certain. Consumption for example is a disease in which there is often obtained without any apparent process of reasoning, a certain state of happy resignation, and singular cheerfulness. In diseases of the stomach, again we have often incontrollable tempers. In diseases of the heart there is often a strange melancholy, and as often a great exuberance of spirits. In certain states of the liver there is often a tremendous impulse to effort as if the party would carry every thing before him impatiently. Now, these are effects analogous to those of stimulants, and therefore it is unreasonable in any one to take upon himself to say, that in mortal diseases in which mental phenomena appear *to advantage*, that the mind is not affected, not impaired thereby, as those diseases in which such is the case may carry on their destructive operation by a similar process to which opium, alcohol, or any other poison may take. It is well-known that all infectious diseases as fever, pox, measles, are

the result of poison introduced into the system, why also for ought that is known to the contrary, may not consumption and such like diseases not arise from the same cause. And as poisons all affect the powers of the mind more or less, sometimes painfully, sometimes pleasantly, there is nothing remarkable from which any thing may be presumed in those instances of disease on which Butler states his argument for the immortality of the soul. Death is the result, and that it is so is weighty reason to suspect, that during the process of the disease ending in death, the powers of the mind *however well they appeared to advantage were unnatural*, "affected and impaired thereby," and suspecting this, it is not natural to conclude death is their destruction.

But even granting that the powers of the mind in any mortal disease are not impaired, what is there in this to justify the notion that death will not destroy them, while we have indisputable evidence in other instances of the capability of the destruction before death, in diseases of the brain, in idiocy and the like. In these we have mental dependence on organic arrangement sufficiently established, and are we to reason, that in those instances, in which the powers of the mind are clean gone, that physical death will restore them on the presumption of their not being impaired up to the point of death in other instances? If this sort of reasoning is justifiable at all, we ought to judge that in the instances Butler alludes to, death *does not* destroy the powers of the mind, and, in the instances we allude to, death does destroy them, *and so nothing is gained*. But on the grounds of Butler as well might we deny that the body cannot be struck dead in a moment, as suppose that the mind cannot as suddenly be destroyed. And talking this way, it may look like something separable, while we speak of diseases of the body and diseases of the mind, and these separately distinguished by different symptoms, but that there is an independence therefore is as probable, as that diseases of the stomach or liver are distinguishable from diseases of the heart and lungs, the one set of organs is independent of the other set of organs. So there is nothing more remarkable in a man having his liver wrong, and all else apparently right, than in a man having his brain wrong, and nothing else apparently wrong. And so also there is nothing more remarkable in the body decaying before the mind, than in the mind decaying before the body, or the more natural decay of both together, and we have everyday occurrences of both together, and we have every day occurrences of all the three, of which an explanation of these varied forms of decay ending in death, may be found in the defects and varieties of early training. Was every man born free from physical defects and his mind and body duly exercised, and equally so in mutual harmony. We should have no such incongruities as insanity in its various forms, no diseases displaying mental phenomena to advantage, no imbeciles with giant strength. And hence we are not warranted to draw any conclusion from abnormal phenomena, to support a theory which presumes to be according to the analogy of nature. We must keep in mind that though it is natural for poison to cause death, it is not natural for man to die by it; though it is natural for man to grow up weak in body or weak in mind by reason of not justly exercising either, it is not natural for him to be either a fool or a sloth. The only true analogy then that can be found is from nature as she would do, were she honorably wooed; not from nature in her freaks, while the victim of seduction. Hence any singular examples of death is something altogether apart from what death is in its natural development, and therefore nothing to the purpose as presumptive evidence of its natural effects, or non-effects on anything. And as to its operation on the soul, it is surely more philosophical to believe that it operates on it as it operates on every other individual in this world's creation, than believe the soul is single, indivisible, and therefore beyond the reach of death. Surely he who created it, can extinguish it, and create it again if he please, with all its present susceptibilities, acquirements, and identical consciousness. That he may do so is not contrary to nature, is compatible with facts in science, is in harmony with reason, and in accordance with scripture. To tell us mind is not

matter, "does not set it beyond the reach of interposition. Is not *mind* a creation, granting even for a moment it is not matter? Did not God create, develop it? Why then should he not end it. He who affirms it is immortal, denies the prerogative of God to stay its cause. The development theory, regarding it as taught by Butler, puts it beyond the power of God to interfere in consistence with his creative act—develop itself it must, and so death becomes a phantom, the resurrection an absurdity, the bible a fiction. If the soul of man is naturally immortal, why are not all things else naturally immortal too? We have no more reason to say this of the one more than the other. If it develop itself independent of deity, why should not all things else do the same. But we see interpositions, and from them infer a providence mediately controlling—we may see a goodly oak shivered by the lightning's flash, we may conceive a world shattered to atoms by confusion, by volcanic irruption, a man cut down in his prime, and all this in direct antagonism to the natural expectation of their beings, and in opposition to the laws of their development; but supposing them immortal, such things could never happen. And moreover it is not necessary to believe, that because the present stage of our life is the uninterrupted development of the past, that the next stage is an uninterrupted development of the present, nor all that appear in the economy of life are developments of what has gone before. We see, for example, in the lowest grades of animal life, something approaching to vegetable life, and in the highest species of vegetable life, something approaching to animal life; but this does not necessitate the conclusion that the one could not be created without the other, that they are related as parent and child. And how many things are there in the gradation of animal life to lead one to suppose as others have supposed, that men are but monkeys in superior development, and monkeys the remote progeny of mites, did not facts reveal something towards a contrary supposition. "The universe according to the theory propounded in the vestiges of creation," says Pearson a popular writer on infidelity, page 58 —"has moved on in its glorious path of revolution from the hour of the creation of Nebulae, without the interposition of God; his existence being deemed necessary to give it beginning, but not necessary to fashion, dispose, continue, and control it. The creator has thus bidden"—we would say, if the theory is in any wise correct, he bids himself retire to the utmost bounds of creation. No room is left for him—we would say he leaves himself no room "to interpose and create a new species." This is the comment of a clergyman of what is called the "orthodox school." We take it as an argument more reasonably applicable to the theory of man's inherent immortality which the writer himself espouses, —as a revelation extends an arm to the rescue of man's nature at least as an exception to the development theory, while there is no very exact revelation to the rescue of much else. In the doctrine of man's inherent immortality, God's fiat is deemed necessary to give the soul of man a beginning, and as that beginning is said to be immortal, it needs nothing further than the law of development to carry it on through its several and eternal ages, and therefore God may retire, —he, here however, does not bid himself retire as it is not God's theory of man, but man's theory, it is man that here bids him retire, and renders unnecessary the revelation as a means of belief by which immortality is said to be attained, as if man is immortal he will live independent of God. By the very act of creating an immortality, God necessarily launches it away beyond his power to extinguish it. Why then need we say more about the distinctive features of the soul of man as inferring something that is not matter beyond the reach of dissolution, as if some men in the height of their pride, as being supposed to partake of the essence of the Deity, could pry into the secrets of the most high, and limit his almighty arm down to the creation of beings, only in accordance with *their* reason, and *their* "common sense," as they term it, as if to create matter to manifest, and exercise thought, were an impossible thing for the Deity. How do they find this out, we should like to know, that they talk so confidently? Bacon tells us, aphorism 48, "the human understanding is active, and cannot halt or rest, but even though without effect still presses forward. Thus we cannot conceive of any end, or external boundary of the world,

and it seems necessarily to occur to us, that there must be something beyond." Thus, as the construction of the eye and ear, imply the existence of light and sound; as the natural appetites imply the existence of objects adapted to satisfy them, so do those cravings after immortality, those boundless insatiable desires, to grasp all knowledge, and yield all power, imply that man has no limit to his being—that he is immortal. Should we not rather say, that those cravings, and insatiable desires, are after what has been lost, than after what has been gained, that they "cannot halt or rest," is because it wants *what it does not possess*, because *it is mortal*, and feign would be immortal, and what shall we say to those appetites which mislead some to miscalculate their mental and physical powers, and grasp at things too high for them, what do they imply? Should such men in the madness of their ambition, and in the flush of their pride, rush on to their unmistakable ruin, they do no more than till the mill, nor manifest more signs of immortality, than the bull who in the fury of his madness, rushes with as much reason and impetuosity to oppose the progress of a railway train. Did Alexander exhibit a brighter manifestation of immortality, while he wept on the throne of the world, than did the apostle, who in ruling his spirit, was greater than he, the taker of cities, in being content with such things as he had. If, supposing, there is something like evidence of man's immortality in those manifestations, is there not more reason to regard them as the traces of a past life capable of immortality, than as proofs of an immortality now present. Just as in an old baronial castle, we perceive indubitable marks of its past glory, and by-gone age, and never would for a moment consider them indications of its present character as bearing on a future restoration, or as we witness in the foot-prints of the creator on the surface of the globe, records of the primeval history creation, so do we read, if there is any thing to be read—in those manifestations in man memorials of what he was capable of when new from the hands of his creator, not indices of what he now is as bearing on a future life. And as the testimony of history records a time in which innocence was the sweetness of his life, and our experience teaches us how now depraved he has become, we more naturally infer a total wreck in the end, from any thing we see natural to his being, than a farther development in another stage of life from what are at best, if it is they do imply something more than belongs to the present—but the vestiges of his Edenic career. If man, however, notwithstanding this becomes immortal, if he should live again after death, this will not take place from any law in his being, from any necessity in his nature, but in a further interposition of providence in accordance with scriptural revelation to which in our following letter we will turn for proof.

And now in concluding this division of the argument, we will shortly recount the ground gone over.

We have shown that the probability of a future life, founded by Butler, on the experience of the changes man undergoes from the womb to the grave, is no greater than the probability we have founded on *the same*, on a life previous to conception, and hence, as we are not conscious of our having lived previous to conception, any more than we are conscious of having lived in the womb, we are by the same reasoning to presume, we will not be conscious in the future life, *the future life Butler points to*, of having lived in the present, so that it is of little consequence *to us what the bible is*, not but that our actions here might still affect our condition there, but that *without* consciousness of having lived in the present life, we would fail in having any knowledge of a redemption, and therefore be without an appreciation of the unfathomable love of God.

In our remarks on *personal identity*, we have shown the Bishop's argument thereon, leads to nothing more than what can be gathered from the personal identity of any creature,

vegetable, or animal, and therefore of *no use* as an inference of a soul in man, beyond the reach of the changes which he undergoes.

His discarding the *reason* of death, on the grounds, that we only know some of its effects, we have by an example in chemical analysis demonstrated as unjust.

His argument on the *assumption* of consciousness being single and indivisible, we have rendered *futile*, by assuming on grounds as legitimate, and as reasonable as Butler's, a definition the reverse of his.

His argument *for* the affections of the mind, not depending on our gross body, in the manner in which perceptions by our organs of sense does, we have shown to fail, in our illustrations of how abstraction the highest distinctive feature of the mind is but a semblance of reality.

His instancing mortal diseases in which the powers of the mind do not seem to be affected, or impaired thereby, up to the point of death, as presumptive evidence that the mind, the soul, is beyond their reach, we have shown to be singularly *impotent*.

The development theory as applied to man, we have shown to be irreconcilable with scripture on the supposition, that scripture as we hope to afterwards show, to be the means of attaining immortality, since were it necessary to the development as a guiding and controlling law, it would require to be a book in the hands of all, and would have required to have existed since the fall in the hands of every man, and not only that, but every man would have required to have submitted to it. This theory of immortality then, as depending on a series of development, evolutions of life in necessarily successive stages is a negation of scripture, and therefore contrary to truth. Scripture teaches no such thing. It teaches the reverse. It is a pity therefore to have to say, that a discourse emanating from a Bishop with the best of motives should be so abortive of the object he desired—should confirm the infidel in his opinions, and mislead others, who trusting to their spiritual advisers have no recourse to scripture themselves.

In our next letter which will follow soon, we will introduce, and commence the scripture argument. We hope this copy will not meet with the fate of the last. You have not said whether your plates of Elpis Israel are undamaged from the fire. We will be glad, indeed, to hear they are safe. Rest assured brother, that however numerous your enemies may be, you have many friends, and not a few on this side of the Atlantic, who are ready to rejoice with you when you rejoice, and sympathize with you in all your trials; you have labored too abundantly, and *do* labor not to be unthought of in what befalls you, or unsung, by those whose grateful feelings for the instruction they have received of you, unites their sympathies with your own in praise and prayer.

I am your brother in one faith,

W. D. JARDINE.

Aberdeen, March 28, 1861.

Analecta Epistolaria.

Difficulty for Solution.

My dear Friend, —If I may trespass a little upon your time, I would like to state a difficulty, which although I have carefully searched in the "Heralds," (which we have from 1854) yet I do not find it touched.

My desire is not to find out how little of the Lord's will I may do, or how much I may leave undone, and yet be accepted at his appearing; I desire to *know* his will, and *do* it, but I fear to offer a superfluous service, knowing that such is as unacceptable as a forbidden service.

If I understand your teaching aright, it is this: —that in order for an individual's baptism, to constitute the "one Baptism," he must previously possess the "one faith" in the "one Lord:" in other words he must comprehend the entire mission of Christ, or the Gospel of the Kingdom, which I understand according to Paul in Gal. iii. 8, to have been first preached to Abraham in the promises made to him through Christ as *the seed*; that in due time *the seed*, or Jesus Christ, took upon him the nature of Abraham, became a sacrifice for sin, that he was raised from the dead, became the intercessor at his father's right hand, where he will remain until the prophecy of the angel to Mary shall be fulfilled; when shall be given to him the throne of his Father David, and he with his brethren will reign in Mount Zion over the House of Jacob for ever; that through our connection with Adam, we are constituted sinners, but by believing these things concerning the kingdom and name of Jesus, and so yielding obedience, we have our "fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life."

All this I comprehend, and heartily believe and rejoice in too, but did not to the same extent at my baptism. —Now it does not appear to me that any of the disciples understood *all* these things, until after the resurrection of Jesus; I do not think they at all understood that he was to be a sacrifice, Luke xxiv. 25, 26, 27. Why then were they not required to be rebaptised after all the mission of Christ became plain to them? I know some would urge that we have not any account of their baptism; but I presume that we could not on that account, entertain the idea that they had not been obedient to the will of their divine master as far as they understood it. If you will give me as early as possible your ideas on this question, I shall be greatly obliged.

Accept of my thanks for all the edification and enjoyment we receive from the "Heralds" and other of your writings.

Praying that your useful life may be prolonged until the cry is heard, "Behold the Bridegroom cometh." I remain

Yours very truly

A. E. BALMAIN.

Philadelphia, Pa., March 16, 1861.

The Apostles Justified by Faith before "the Faith" came.

THE point of difficulty in our correspondent's mind is this—if the "defective faith" of the apostles did not necessitate their reimmersion, why should the defective faith of our contemporaries? In other words, if the ignorance of the apostles in regard to the death, burial,

and resurrection of Jesus, and the things founded upon these facts, did not invalidate their baptism administered by John, why should a baptist, Campbellite, or other immersionist's ignorance of the kingdom of God and his righteousness, make invalid the immersion to which they have been subjected? Is not their immersion the "one baptism" although their "faith" is defective of many things embraced in the "one faith" and the "one hope of the calling?"

This appears to be the difficulty for us to consider. Let us see, then, if it be real and insuperable or not.

In the first place we remark that the case of the apostles is exceptional. They were Israelites under the law, which was then in full force, the Abrahamic covenant not having been confirmed by the blood of its Mediator, the Christ. They were not required to believe in the mystery of its confirmation any more than the prophets were until the confirmation were established. They were under a dispensation of "justification *by faith*" not of "justification *through the faith*;" because when they were justified "the faith" had not come—Rom. iii. 30; Gal. iii. 24. Until the resurrection of Jesus they were "under the law" as Jesus was himself under the law, which was the schoolmaster of Israel who were "shut up to the faith which should afterwards be revealed." This was a position which could only be occupied by Israelites previous to the revelation of the faith. After that faith came, they were no longer "shut up." The apostles were shut up as Daniel, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel were "shut up to the faith." Their faith was the faith of these prophets, with the addition that they believed that Jesus was the Son of David and Son of the Deity whom he had anointed with holy spirit; in other words, "the Christ the King of Israel", whom he had covenanted to Abraham and David to inherit the land and to occupy the throne.

This was their faith. They believed the things covenanted to Abraham and David, and that Jesus was the Christ; but they did not understand nor believe, though it was told them, that Jesus should be put to death and rise again, they did not know, in any sense of the word *know* that there should be remission of sins to the prophets and themselves through the death and resurrection of Jesus; that is, through the crucificial outpouring of his soul as the blood of the Abrahamic and Davidian covenants in the promises of which they believed. This is evident from Luke.xviii. 31, 34, where it is written that Jesus said to the twelve, "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and all things that are written by the prophets concerning the Son of man shall be accomplished. For he shall be delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked, and spitefully entreated, and spitted on; and they shall scourge him, and put him to death; and the third day he shall rise again. *And they understood none of these things; and this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things that were spoken.*" John tell us that their ignorance of this class of truths continued until Jesus was glorified. Jno. xii. 16. Then they received the holy spirit, the spirit of truth, which guided them into all the truth; and showed them many things which in the beginning of the week of confirmation, Daniel's seventieth week, they were not able to bear. —Jno. xvi. 4, 12, 13, 25.

The apostles, then, were justified by faith in the gospel of the kingdom, and in Jesus as its anointed king. This is positive. They were not justified by faith in a Christ who they believed would suffer death and rise again. This is negative. That they were justified before the death of Jesus is evident from John xv. 3, where it is written, "*Ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you.*" This word which Jesus spoke to them was "the word of the kingdom, also styled "the Gospel of the Kingdom," and "the kingdom of God"—Luke xviii. 17; ix. 60, 2, 6; viii. 1; iv. 43, 18; Mat. xiii. 19, 23 ; iv. 23. Faith in it and Jesus was

justifying. It cleansed, or purified them all from sins, except Judas. He was excepted, and pronounced "unclean;" for he had not received "the word" into an honest and good heart.

The apostles believed all they were required to believe. They were not required to believe what was purposely hidden from them. They had honored God in accepting his counsel preached to them through John the baptizer. They had been baptized with "the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins," predicated on faith in the promises covenanted to Israel's fathers, and the approaching manifestation of the Christ. When he appeared they recognized him. He preached the same gospel as John, but amplified in detail. They believed it, and Jesus completed what John had begun in washing their feet, and without which they could have no part with him in the joy that was set before him—Jno. xiii. 8. They had washed in John's baptism, therefore they needed not save to have their feet washed by Jesus, who thus "shod them with the preparation of the gospel" and made them clean every whit—verse 10; Eph. vi. 15. Things being thus ordered, it only remained "to redeem them from the curse of the law;" to redeem them by the same act that should purchase Isaiah, Jeremiah, Daniel, and all the saints under the law, from its curse. This redemption was effected by Jesus submitting to be made a curse for them. This was accomplished, not by his wilful violation of the law, but by his enemies nailing him to a tree, or cross; and so forcibly bringing the curse of the Mosaic law upon him, which says, "Cursed every one that hangeth on a tree." Thus *the nature* crucified was cursed, eternally cursed; and therefore can never occupy the kingdom of God and the earth for ever. The life of the nature that transgressed in the person of the first Adam, became a covering for sin in the sinless person of the second Adam. When glorified the crucified nature was transformed into *holy spirit-nature*, styled by Paul, "*spiritual body*" or the body consubstantial with the Father. This is the nature Jesus now possesses, and to which he attained at the price of "the crucifixion of the flesh" in every sense of the phrase.

When the redemption price was thus paid the law of Moses had no more dominion over the apostles. Its curses had become ineffectual in their case. Every whit clean by the arrangement indicated, they could stand up on Pentecost, and under inspiration of holy spirit, could reveal to the astonished Israelites the new doctrine of God's system of justification in the name of Jesus, attested by the law that cursed him, and by the prophets. Being redeemed from the curse of the law they had received the adoption of sons; and because they were sons He had sent forth the spirit of his son into their hearts; and they could stand up and proclaim without sin "justification through the faith," independently of the sacrifices prescribed by the ritual of Moses. "The faith" had come, and they were no longer under the Mosaic schoolmaster.

The reader, then, will bear in mind the distinction subsisting between "*justification by faith*," and "*justification through the faith*." The apostles and prophets were justified, or cleansed from all their sins "by faith;" but since the day of Pentecost no Jew nor Gentile can obtain pardon or purification by the same formula as they. To believe the word of the kingdom, and that Jesus is Son of God, will, since that notable day, save no man apart from the revealed mystery; nor would the belief that the Christ should die and be raised again, apart from the recognition of Jesus as the Christ, and the word of the kingdom save a believer. The area of "faith" was enlarged by the apostolic proclamation into "the faith," so that after the day of Pentecost, the doctrine of the apostles presented people with more things to be believed for justification than were believed by Abraham, Moses, David, Daniel, or themselves. Till the glorification of Jesus they were "fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets had spoken;" for they did not understand that the Christ ought to have suffered the things

Jesus suffered, and afterwards to enter upon his glory. Luke xxiv, 25. But when Jesus was about to be taken up and received into glory, he opened their understanding that they might understand the scriptures of Moses, the Prophets, and the Psalms, concerning him; and said unto them, "Thus it is written, and thus it behoved the Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day; and that repentance, and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all the nations, beginning at Jerusalem."—verse 44.

Such was the case of the apostles in regard to their personal justification, which resolved itself into—

1. Their baptism of John's immersion of repentance for remission of sins through the word Jesus should preach to them.
2. Their belief of that word of the kingdom in an honest and good heart.
3. Their confession that he was the anointed Son of the Deity and King of Israel; and,
4. Their feet being washed by the personal ministry of the King himself.

Here was a work of the Spirit which occupied a much longer time to accomplish than a modern clerical religion-getting. This is the excitement of an instant which leaves the proselyte as ignorant of the truth as it found him; whereas the cleansing of the apostles every whit was, like that of Abraham's justification, an affair of years. The apostles were a practical illustration of the word in Dan. ix, 27, concerning the transactions of the seventieth week, "He shall confirm a covenant for many one week, and *in* half of the week he shall cause to cease from sacrificing and offering." They belonged to the Week of Confirmation, in which the spirit was causing to cease from sin-offerings; preparing a covering for iniquity; introducing a righteousness for the hidden periods; sealing the vision of the eighth chapter, and the prophet; and anointing the holiest of the holy ones, or saints. Their baptism of John did not cause them to cease from sacrificing and offering according to the Mosaic law: nor did their feet-washing by Jesus. Till he put away sin-offerings by the sacrifice of himself, the immersed apostles were under the dominion of the law, and bound to attend to its requirements; but when Jesus died "to redeem the transgressions under the law," their iniquity and that of all the prophets was covered; and in his resurrection their justification was complete. The righteousness they had acquired was such as the law could not give. This could only represent the taking away of sins, not actually and permanently abolish them: while the state perfected by the death and resurrection of Jesus, invested them with a purification which needed not to be renewed in all subsequent time, and would be found sufficient for the Millennial Period and beyond, in other words, "*for ever.*" After Deity was "justified in spirit," by the perfecting of Jesus, the apostles no longer offered sacrifices and offerings. They "ceased sacrificing and offering," though sacrifices and offerings continued to be offered according to the law, for nearly forty years after by all Israelites who did not submit to the Deity's system of righteousness exhibited in the gospel the apostles preached.

From these premises the reader will perceive that John's baptism was altogether wrong and out of place after the resurrection of Jesus. It was quite right in its right place; but altogether wrong out of its place. A prepentecostal immersion is therefore impossible; and the case of the apostles who were subjects of it, altogether irrelevant to any supposable among us. Their faith was according to the formula of the week of confirmation, which terminated with the cutting off of Messiah the prince at the crucifixion. It was not defective for

"justification by faith," though it was defective for "justification through the faith," which, however, when they were cleansed was to them impossible, seeing that "the faith" had not then as yet come.

But "justification by faith" according to the import of the phrase under the law, is as impossible to us as "justification through the faith" before the resurrection of Jesus was to them. Jesus preached the coming faith, but his hearers none of them understood it, because it was hidden from them. For this cause, was styled "the wisdom of the Deity in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom." Their justification was not predicated upon what was purposely hidden from them; for God is not an austere master reaping where he hath not sown, and gathering where he hath not scattered. Men's justification, whether Jews or Gentiles, is predicated on their belief of what he hath revealed. When the hidden wisdom was revealed, then "the faith came," and men were required to believe it *in addition to what the apostles believed* when they were "justified by faith," before the cutting off of the Prince of the Host. Our justification does not depend on our believing what will be revealed to the nations in the millennial dawn, when the law shall go forth from Zion and the word of Jehovah from Jerusalem, as testified in Isai. ii, 8. This is to us "hidden wisdom." Secret things belong to God, the things that are revealed to us, and to our children. —Deut. xxix, 29. This was the rule for Israel, and the rule for us who would find the "righteousness of God."

The revelation of the hidden wisdom, or mystery, of the Deity, styled in Acts ii. 11, "the wonderful works of God," was the grand distinctive peculiarity of the apostolic preaching on Pentecost and forward. Nothing less than the belief of the teaching of the apostles can now justify a single son or daughter of the first Adam. He that hears them so as to believe and do what they taught, hears the Deity; and he that hears them not is not "taught of God," and cannot therefore be saved, however pious he may be in his own estimation, and that of his contemporaries. This is evident from the words of Jesus, who said to the apostles, "It shall be given you what ye shall speak; for it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh by you; and he that heareth you heareth Me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me."—Matt. x. 19, 20; Luke x. 16. And speaking of those who come to him as the result of the attracting influence of the Father, Jesus said, "It is written in the prophets, and they shall be taught of God. Every man therefore that hath *heard* and hath *learned* of the Father, cometh unto me."—Jno. vi. 44. To hear the apostles, then, is to hear Jesus and the Father; and consequently to be taught of the apostles is to be taught of God; and all that are so taught have heard and learned of the Father, and are drawn or attracted by what they have heard and learned to Jesus. None else "*come to Jesus*" in the scriptural sense of the word. All who come to him are intelligent in "the faith." There are no ignoramuses among the genuine disciples, for these are "all taught of the Deity;" and when the Deity teaches his teaching, "opens the eyes, turns" the taught "from darkness" "into the marvellous light" of the gospel of his glory. —Act xxvi. 18; 1 Pet. ii. 9. How different this from the result of clerical teaching, preaching, ministration, or by whatever name they may designate the wordy outpourings of their cracked and truly earthen vessels! Those who "come to Jesus" in the clerical sense, are those who come to the clergy, and become members of their synagogues. They are brought to this, not by the teaching of the apostles, but by the "*enticing words of man's wisdom*," which leave them in darkness as profound as the craftiest soul-dealer could possibly wish. Any intelligent believer conversing with such, can easily discern that they are not taught of God, but only of the clergy; for he will find them entirely ignorant of the first principles of the oracles of God. With the prophets they have nothing to do; for the apostles they have as little use; of the gospel of the kingdom they have never heard; and the revelation of the mystery might as well have never been revealed, for any use they have for it in their system of "getting

religion," and saving immortal souls from the death that never dies!!! In such a system "marvellous light" is out of the question; for in every corner of it can be discovered only the murkiest gloom, and darkness that may be felt. The Father and Jesus are despised by the adherents of the clergy, because the apostles are not heard. The whole establishment is Laodicean, and the voice of the Deity finds no utterance within its pale. These are incontrovertible facts. The teaching and mandates of the apostles are not regarded in the kingdom of the clergy, and therefore we know that the spirit of their establishments is not the Spirit of the Deity; but "the Spirit of Error" and of "strong delusion," which is the spirit of their revivals, and the spirit of which their "religion" comes. —1 Jno. iv. 5, 6; 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12.

The pentecostian "truth as it is in Jesus" is "rightly divided" by that skilful workman, the apostle of the Gentiles, in Rom. xvi. 25. In ascribing glory to the only wise Deity, he refers to the word of truth in a three-fold relation of things which may be thus stated:

1. "My Gospel."
2. "The preaching of Jesus Christ," and,
3. "The revelation of the mystery concealed from the times of the ages."—*χρονους αιωνων*, —the times of the law and of the periods that preceded it.

1. These are the triple elements of the whole system of faith Jesus called "the gospel," and which he commanded the apostles to go forth and preach, and declared that whosoever believed it and was baptised should be saved, but whosoever believed it not should be condemned. The "one hope" of this system he styled "my gospel," or "the gospel of me,"—the gospel preached of me, Paul. In another place he terms it "the hope of Israel," on account of which he was a prisoner in chains. —Acts xxvii. 20. Elsewhere he alludes to it as "the gospel preached to Abraham," and which announced the justification of all the nations through faith, and the blessing of them in company with faithful Abraham. It was therefore his gospel in an especial sense, because he was separated by the Deity to declare and teach it authoritatively to the Gentiles; and whoever taught any thing perverse or subversive of it, he pronounced accursed."—Gal. i. 6-9; iii. 8. 9. The clergy do not preach this gospel. Indeed, how can they! For they are as ignorant of it as though it had never been apocalypted or revealed. Paul, then, whose image they set in niches for the ornamentation of their bazaars, not we, though we approve his sentence, pronounces them "accursed." Let the reader, then, renounce these men-pleasers whom the world hears and glorifies, and study diligently Paul's gospel of the approaching government of the habitable by the resurrected and anointed King of Israel. — Acts xvii, 31.

2. When Paul's contemporaries had come to comprehend the purpose of the Deity with respect to the nations existing in the age to come—that he intended to rule them by the Christ—he next proclaimed to them that Jesus was that Christ. This he styles "the preaching of Jesus Christ." Their belief of the gospel of the kingdom and name of Christ abstractly from Jesus, would not have justified, or saved them from their sins, and given them a right to the life of the age, after Pentecost. They were required to recognize him as the Son of David, Son of the Deity, and King of the Jews; for if they rejected, or did not accept him as Lord, *and received not his words*, their fate was to be "destroyed from among the people."—Jno. xii. 48; Acts iii. 23. This arrangement has not been altered by the authority of heaven since Paul's day. The clergy have abolished or superseded it by their traditions; but God has no respect for them or their institutions. They are elements of a power "*that thinks to change times and laws*," (Dan. vii. 25) and which speaks great things, and blasphemies, and opens its mouth in

blasphemy against the Deity, to blaspheme his name and his tabernacle, and them that dwell in the heaven. —Rev. xiii. 5. The influence of this clerical power in all its Laodicean developments, is self-deceptive, and destructive of the people who obey its behests. In relation to them "the times and laws" are changed, and a way of salvation which, in verity, is no salvation at all, established, that makes the truth of God of no effect. But all this with God is nothing. His plan of salvation is unchanged; and if any man of this generation be saved, he can be saved only as men were saved in the days of the apostles. They must believe Paul's gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ.

3. But a man may believe the hope Paul proclaimed, and that Jesus is the Christ, and yet not believe enough to save him. He must believe, in addition, the revealed mystery in its facts and doctrine. Suppose he believe that all nations shall be blessed in Abraham and his seed; that Abraham shall inherit with his seed, Jesus and the saints, the promised land for the millennial period and beyond; that David's throne shall be established and exist in all that period; that the twelve tribes, then an obedient and faithful nation, shall occupy the land; that Jesus and his holy brethren shall possess the government of the world, as Jehovah's anointed kings and priests, incorruptible and deathless, —suppose he believe all this, what benefit would it be to the man if he denied, or did not believe that Jesus died, was buried, and rose again, —that he was delivered for the sins of his people, and raised again for their justification? These facts, and the teaching predicated upon them, are indispensable elements of "the faith" through which men are justified. It was in the preaching of Jesus Christ and the revealed mystery, that Paul's Israelitish fellow-countrymen needed to be especially indoctrinated. The gospel preached to Abraham was well known to them, for it was "the hope of Israel," and had been preached to them in the reading of the prophets for many centuries. Not so, however, with the Gentiles. These were ignorant of the whole subject, and had to be taught everything from the beginning.

But how completely have the clergy changed everything. They have substituted "another gospel," which is peculiarly their own. They have led the people to believe that if they possess faith in Jesus Christ, and be pious, they will be saved. They have retained in their system of error a few grains of truth, which gives it currency among the ignorant. What they preach is not "the faith," in any of its three-fold relations; and as a man could not be saved without believing the whole, neither could he be saved by believing all the clergy teach according to the institutes of any of the denominations extant. Let us be content with "*the old paths*" indicated by the apostles, for nothing short of their prescription can give health and soundness to the soul.

The apostles, then, were "justified by faith," and preached "justification through the faith," to all who should "*obey the truth.*" "Ye have purified your souls," says Peter, "in obeying the truth." The truth cannot be obeyed unless it be believed. In other words, if a man have not the faith in his understanding and affection, he cannot yield "the obedience of faith," or obey "the law of faith." The burial of a true believer with Christ in immersion is the *act of faith* which constitutes obedience. None but a true believer can enact it. The immersion of an ignorant sinner is altogether out of the premises of the gospel. He that does it knowingly is a wilful blasphemer of the name of the Deity; and the person dipped only adds to his sins by his presumption. The one faith and the one hope of the calling, must precede the immersion to constitute the "one baptism;" if either, or both, be wanting, the immersion is invalid. Fifty immersions will not supply the want of the faith; but, on the other hand, if the subject's faith be apostolic, one immersion is sufficient, and ought, on no account, to be repeated.

The necessity of reimmersion, consequent upon defectiveness in the subject's faith, is evinced in the twelve cases at Ephesus, recorded in Acts xix. 2-7. These were certain baptists whose faith did not embrace "the preaching of Jesus Christ," and "the revelation of the mystery." They believed what the quasi-apostle of the Baptist denomination * preached concerning the Messiah being about to appear; but they did not know that he had appeared, and that Jesus was he. They had been baptized into John's baptism by Apollos, but not into the "one baptism," at a time when John's baptism was an anachronism, and altogether out of place. When Paul found this he explained the matter to them, and showed them that John baptized into the faith of a coming Messiah, on whom they should believe when he appeared, and that Jesus was he. When they understood this matter they accepted his teaching concerning Jesus, and were baptized into his name. Paul's teaching supplied the deficiency of their faith, which became perfect in kind and degree. But when thus perfected he did not tell them that, as they were already immersed, there was no occasion to repeat the immersion; or that their recently amended faith would legitimize their previous immersion. Suppose they died as Baptists, before Paul succeeded in rectifying their faith, which was good enough as far as it went, would they rise from the dead at the apocalypse of Jesus Christ, in power and great glory, to share with him in his joy? if any one answer this question in the affirmative, then he declares in effect, that since the manifestation of the King of Israel, a man may be saved in total ignorance of Jesus, and consequently of "the truth as it is in him," which is preposterous: Their immersion, then, was like their premises, invalid; hence it was necessary when the premises were rectified, to rectify the conclusion, by immersing them again, which was done.

* John because styled "*the Baptist*," is an object of undue veneration to the denomination that traces its origin to his mission.

Our correspondent was originally an English Baptist, afterwards a Campbellite, and when the life of Campbellism expired, she became, like many others, an American Baptist, which is her position for the time being. Between these immersionisms there are but shades of difference. They are all Baptists, and fellowship one another as Christians. And so they ought, for they are all "Christians" of the same stamp, —the Laodicean. They all agree in whittling the truth to the finest possible point, even to a monosyllable. They ask a child if he believes in the Lord Jesus, and wants to go to heaven; or that he is Son of God? To which he answers "Yes," and upon this monosyllable they dip him in water, and call him a Christian, and his immersion the "one baptism."!!! Angels and men, what have we come to! They call this Christianity, and quote Luke and Paul to prove it! What need have such of Paul's gospel, the apostolic preaching of Jesus Christ, and the revealed mystery? They "get," their "religion" in ignorance of the whole subject; their piety is generated by the terror of hell-torments; and both their religion and piety are continued in flickering existence in absolute ignorance of the divine testimony; and at the same time they delude themselves with the notion that they are the very elect, and just the people the Lord requires for his companions beyond the realms of time and space eternally! But the most marvellous thing of all is, that a man who has been enlightened in the truth, and holds the whole system in merited contempt, can be so lost to a scriptural sense of his responsibility to the truth he has confessed, and to the high position he had attained as a son of God and an heir of his kingdom, as to condescend to the extreme degradation of a deaconship in a synagogue of such professors! Would the least intelligent and meanest apostolical have acted thus? Assuredly not.

EDITOR.

The Court of the Gentiles.

Aristotle.

This world renowned philosopher of the fleshly order of wisdom, was a disciple of Plato, and flourished three hundred and thirty years or more before Christ. He was preceptor of Alexander surnamed "the Great;" and representative of the Notable Horn Power between the eyes of the Macedonian He-Goat, treated of in Dan. viii. 5. Some idea of the estimation in which Aristotle was held by his contemporaries may be formed from the letter of Philip, king of Macedon, announcing to him the birth of his son Alexander. "I am to inform you," said he, "that I have a son born. I return thanks to the gods, not so much for having given him to me, as for having given him me while Aristotle is living. I may justly promise myself, that you will make him a successor worthy of us both, and a king worthy of Macedonia."

Aristotle was the rival of "the divine Plato," and taught that "Matter was eternal; that the world by powers natural to matter, has continued from all eternity the same as we see it, and that there exists nothing in the universe distinct from matter; that the present course of things, consisting of the motions of the heavens, and of the successive generations and corruptions of animals and vegetables, can neither be interrupted nor destroyed by any thing extraneous, but must be continued for ever. As for the Deity, if there were any, he taught that it is a nature happy in the contemplation of itself, and entirely regardless of human affairs." The Scriptures were translated into Greek by the Seventy after his time.

Epicureanism.

The founder of the Epicurean branch of "the wisdom from beneath," from the depths of the carnal mind, was Epicurus, who flourished in Greece two hundred and seventy years before Christ; and after the translation of the Septuagint not many years. The Epicurean maintained that,

"The world arose from chance; that the gods whose existence they did not dare to deny, neither did nor could extend their providential care to human affairs; that the soul was mortal; that pleasure was to be regarded as the ultimate end of man, and that virtue was neither worthy of esteem nor choice, but with a view to the attainment of pleasure."

"Pleasure is supposed by some to mean, in this system, not only sensual, but to comprehend moral and intellectual pleasures. "If so," says one, "in what does the scheme of Epicurus, as respects virtue, differ from the opinion of those 'Christian philosophers' who maintain that self-love is the only spring of all human affections and actions?"

The Oriental Philosophy.

ORIENTALISM is denominated, not philosophy, but "science falsely so called," by Paul in his letter to Timothy. The votaries of it were numerous in Persia, Syria, Chaldea, and Egypt. Of this science there were many sects. It has been thought worthy of remark, that, while, "the Greek and Roman sects of philosophy were much divided about the first principles of science, all the sects of the oriental science deduced their tenets from one fundamental principle." This science supposed that,

"The origin of evils, with which the universe abounds, was to be found not in God, whom they viewed as essentially good and benevolent; but as there was nothing beyond or without the Deity but matter, therefore matter is the centre and source of all evil, and vice. That matter was eternal and derived its present form, not from the will of the supreme God, but from the creating power of some inferior intelligence, to whom the world and its inhabitants owed their existence. Some imagined two eternal principles from whence all things proceeded, the one presiding over light, and the other over matter; and by their perpetual conflict, explained the mixture of good and evil that appears in the universe. Others maintained that the being who presided over matter was not an eternal principle, but a subordinate intelligence, one of those whom the supreme God produced from himself. They supposed that this being was moved by a sudden impulse to reduce to order the rude mass of matter and to create the human race. A third sort fell *upon* another system, and said there was a Triple Divine Principle or a triumvirate in which the Supreme Deity was distinguished from the material, and from the creator of this world. The Supreme Being they supposed to be a radiant light, most pure, different from the immensity of space, called the Pleroma. The eternal nature, having dwelt long in solitude, produced from itself two minds of a different sex, which resembled the Supreme Parent in the most perfect manner. In process of time, from these two proceeded a celestial family. These were called Eons. How many of these there were was not decided. The creator of this world they styled Demiurgus.

"Man they considered a compound of terrestrial and celestial nature; of the evil principle of matter, and of divinity. Those who subdue the evil principle that propels them to sin against the Supreme ascend directly to the Pleroma: those yielding to the evil principle shall be sent after death into other bodies, until they awake from their sinful lethargy. In the end, the Supreme God shall come forth victorious, and, having delivered from their servitude the greatest part of those enslaved souls, shall dissolve the frame of the visible world, and involve it in ruin. After this primitive tranquillity will be restored in the universe, and God shall reign with happy spirits in undisturbed felicity through endless ages.

Such is a brief outline of the opinions current among the Gentiles elaborated by the thinking of the flesh, darkened by ignorance of the divine testimony, and sin, in the last days of the Mosaic world. It was a hash, well and truly designated by Paul, "philosophy and vain deceit," vain babbling and oppositions of science, falsely so called." No one professing the faith, who received them in whole or in part, could avoid being spoiled by them. It was the commingling of these fleshly thinkings with the word of God that corrupted the faith of Israel: and afterward the doctrine of the apostles delivered to both Jews and Gentiles. They faithfully discharged their mission, but "false brethren" who "had pleasure in unrighteousness," who desired to popularize the truth, that they might be zealously affected by the simpletons they deceived, mixed it up with these crotchets of the flesh, and out of the offensive mixture presented to the world the mess of stuff "the spirit spued out of his mouth," in the early part of the fourth century. —Revelations iii. 16. Out of this vomit grew up and matured that system of things extant in our world, popularly, and therefore falsely styled, but universally recognized as "Christianity;" and apocalyptically symbolized by prostitutes. —Rev. xiv. 4, xvii. 5. Christianity in the popular sense, in its ecclesiasticism, is constituted of what the intoxicated multitude (Rev. xvii. 2) call "all the Names and Denominations of Christians," but which the Spirit styles "the Mother of Harlots, and all the Abominations of the Earth;" and in another place "Names of blasphemy." This harlot brood of clerical sects is the modern expression of the old heathen sects of "philosophy" and "science." The one is parent of the other, and the flesh is father of them all: the chief difference being, that the ancient heathen theologians said nothing about Jesus, as he had not then appeared; while the modern heathen

philosophers, or clergy, interlard their speculations on God, souls, heaven, and hell, with expressions concerning him as an element of what their predecessors, professing "science falsely so called," styled "the Triple Divine Principle." Ancient heathenism and modern heathenism are essentially the same,—"the thinking of the flesh," unenlightened by the truth from first to last. We advise the reader to have nothing to do with the clergy or their sects. We say nothing against their sincerity, for we cannot read their individual hearts. They may be sincere, and they may not; we cannot tell: but this for ourselves, we know assuredly that they are not Christian. They and theirs are nought else but a Laodicean counterfeit of the reality. The principles and practices which make up their piety, begin and end where those of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Zeno, and Antisthenes, began and ended, namely, in the thinking of the flesh; whose "philosophy" and "science," conventionally termed "wisdom," are mere foolishness in the estimation of God, and of all who are taught of him to the understanding of the truth. Our pious and sincere clergy belong to the same church as the pious and sincere Socrates and Plato, whose souls have oftentimes been placed in heaven by their clerical admirers in discourse concerning them.

There can be no doubt, then, in the mind of one enjoying the "marvellous light" of God's wisdom, that the Romish and Protestant clerical orders and sects belong to "the court of the Gentiles," as well as the old heathen sacerdotal orders and sects. They teach with Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and the Eclectics, that there is a soul in man which is immaterial and immortal; that it is an emanation from God's essence; and that man is an union of malignant matter and immaterial and deathless mind: they teach with them the malignity and corruption of matter; they teach with them the existence of demons, "an order of beings inferior to the Deity and superior to man,"—the disembodied souls of dead men and women, whom they style "saints;" and teach with them that they ought to be worshipped as mediators. Hence the worship of the ghosts christened by "the church" the Virgin Mary, St. Patrick, St. Boniface, St. Januarius, and so forth, which would be as appropriately named the Harlot Jezebel, St. Blarney, St. Alcohol, St. Humbug, and so forth. These are the demons, *δαιμόνια*, incorrectly rendered "*devils*" in the C. V., worshipped and honored by the Romanists and Protestants in their spiritual calendars, and temples dedicated to their honor; and on account of which the judgments of the fifth and sixth trumpets were sounded against anti-christendom.—Rev. ix. 20. They introduced the austerity of the Stoics into their system, through monastic and conventual establishments. They make what they call "virtue," the sanctimoniousness of sect, the only bond of friendship, as Antisthenes; so that if a pupil try their principles by the word, and find them not of the truth, and testify to that effect, he is treated as an enemy.

With the orientalists of the court they teach that the origin of evils was not in God, though the scriptures positively declare that he created evil. The clergy teach with them an immaterial Deity, and assign to matter the source of all evil, and of all vice. This leaves what they call the immaterial immortal soul, a sinless entity; why then send it to hell for punishment? The clerical God and Devil are the two eternal antagonistic principles of the universe which, figure so conspicuously in the "science" of the East. Their dogma of the Trinity is a plagiarism from the same source; and the God they proclaim an incorporeal diffusion of radiance through the universe—an abstraction without body and without parts, is equally the God of "the Names and Denominations" as of the magicians and sorcerers of the far east. Nor is the analogy yet exhausted. The rewards and punishment of souls taught by the clergy are referable to the same source of error. The terms of their teaching are alone changed. The substance yet remains. "Those who subdue the evil principle that propels them to sin against the Supreme ascend directly to the Peroma." This is the root of the clerical dogma of going to heaven beyond the skies at death. The old Chaldeans and our "Reverend

Divines" are in full fellowship upon this point. An almost universal restoration also comes from the same fountain; for according to "science," the Supreme God shall deliver the greater part of the souls enslaved in sin and death; and having escorted them into the pleroma, "dissolve the frame of this visible world, and involve it in ruin." This is the origin of "world-burning;" a tradition which has bewildered the brains of all classes of Laodiceans, whether "wise" or foolish. Astronomers and "divines" are all struck with the same folly which is very scientific, but entirely false.

Here then is a oneness between the ancient and modern leaders of the blind. Modern heathenism is just the ancient "christened" with "holy water" in the name of Jesus. Some think us very uncharitable in all this. But we cannot help it. We see that the matter is as we have stated it, and therefore we hesitate not to declare it; for we are not of that class who believe one thing and speak another; nor are we afraid to speak out what we believe. The heathen dogmas held by the clergy make it impossible for them to believe and preach the truth. If this be true, it ought to be proclaimed upon the housetops. We are sure it is, and therefore we warn all who would find the truth to eschew the clergy and their traditions as the path of deception that leadeth unto death.

EDITOR.

Miscellanea.

The Essential Baptism: What is it?

BY JOHN O. WOODRUFF, ELIZABETH, N. J.

OUR Lord, just before ascending to the right hand of the Father, left this, His last command, to his disciples—"Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be condemned." Or, as Matthew says, "Go ye and teach" (make disciples, or Christians of) "all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."

Luke records it thus, —"Then opened He their understandings that they might understand the Scriptures, and said, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day: and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem." These were about the last words the Saviour uttered; therefore it must be important to have a right understanding of them. In order to do this, we must search the Scriptures, by comparing scripture with scripture.

We find that after the disciples had witnessed the ascension of Jesus, they returned from the Mount of Olives to Jerusalem, and tarried there, waiting for the promise of the Father, according to the Saviour's direction. In about seven days the promise was realized; it was on the day of Pentecost; at which time they were all with one accord in one place: on which occasion, Peter, (who always seemed to be the foreman of the jury, —to whom also Christ committed the keys of the kingdom of heaven, which pertained to the binding and loosing of sins), stood up and began, at Jerusalem, to preach repentance and remission of sins in the name of Jesus. Now, how did Peter do this? When those that received the word preached, asked what they should do, what did Peter tell them? Acts ii. 33—"Then Peter said unto them, Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the

remission of sins." Thus the mystery of the kingdom is solved. Peter has revealed the secret committed to him; he has used the keys, and made known the plan by which God will in future remit sins.

We find, by the record, that they acted accordingly, —"Then they that gladly received the word were baptized." About eight years after this, we find Peter still advocating the same doctrine in the case of Cornelius, who was the first Gentile convert. In preaching the word on this occasion, Peter says, all the Prophets gave witness to Him (Christ), that through *His name* whosoever believeth in Him should receive remission of sins. After Peter had explained the matter, and Cornelius and his house had heard and understood the word, they were commanded to be baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. Do we not learn from this history the necessity of putting on the name of Christ by baptism or immersion? This was what Peter commanded Cornelius and his house to do, and these were the words whereby they should be saved. This is a remarkable history. See Acts x. and xi.

Now we will follow Peter still further. In his first Epistle to the strangers scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, etc., which was about twenty years after, —he says, "God by his Spirit, spake through Noah to the antediluvians while the ark was preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls were saved by water. The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us, (not the putting away the filth of the flesh;") that is, baptism was not like the divers washings, under the ceremonial law for the purification of the flesh; these could not make the comers thereunto perfect, as pertaining to the conscience: baptism rather related to a moral purification, by giving "the answer of a good conscience toward God, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ."

Now, the question arises, how does baptism save us? Baptism introduces us into Christ the anti-typical ark; and by being in Christ what do we get? We get a life beyond the grave, which is eternal, by a resurrection from the dead. It is in this sense baptism saves us. So we see that Peter is still harmonious on the subject of baptism.

From what has been said, baptism is, in some way connected with remission of sins. The remission of sins is granted to a believer of the gospel of the kingdom, through the name of Jesus as the Christ. How can such a believer get at that name without immersion in water, into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit? If a lady wish to take on herself a man's name, that she may have a legal right to all that belongs to his name, she must come lawfully to the marriage ceremony. When this is performed, his name is named upon her, and she acquires new rights and privileges on account of his name. If she be married to another, the ceremony imparts nothing to her; but if she be legally eligible, then the ceremony gives her everything on account of her husband's name.

Now, the church is represented as the bride of Christ. Immersion into the name can only unite, or marry, those to the name of Jesus who believe the untraditionized gospel of the kingdom of God and of his Christ. The figures used in speaking of baptism, in the word, are a washing—a burial—a planting—a birth with water; according to these figures, the ceremonial action can only be immersion in water. Christ has left us a pattern. To fulfil all righteousness, it became necessary for Him to be baptized, and in so doing, God acknowledged Him as His Son. A voice came from the heavens, saying, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." Is there not something striking in this? John bore testimony, saying, "This is He which came by water; and not by water only, but by water and blood." Jesus himself says, "Except a man be born out of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of

God." The subsequent acts of the apostles are all in harmony with the foregoing. They did not exceed their commission in baptizing with water.

Paul's teaching is also in harmony with this. How was he called to be an apostle, separated unto the Gospel of God? Was it not by obeying the same form of doctrine delivered by Jesus and the apostles? and being *then* made free from (the dominion of) sin? He thenceforth had his fruit unto holiness. He taught the way of getting into Christ was by being baptized into him. In his letter to the Galatians, he says, "We are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ." Our relationship to God is then changed. In this ordinance we are represented as putting off the sins of the flesh, and putting on the new man; we are inducted into the body of Christ, and become, by adoption, the seed of Abraham, and an heir to the promised inheritance.

How does a stranger and foreigner become an adopted citizen of another country? Is it not through a legal process? complying with the requirements of the constitution of that country? and so becoming a citizen in every sense, but the accident of natural birth? God also has a system of means through which individuals are adopted into His family; and by which they are no longer "strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God." And does not baptism form an important part of God's redeeming plan? A careful reader of the Bible cannot fail to observe how often mention is made of a class of persons recognized as being in Christ, in the Lord, etc. They have come under a constitution of righteousness, by being made the righteousness of God in Christ Jesus, through faith and obedience. God has provided a sin covering for us, and we must avail ourselves of it, if we would inherit life. Our connection with the first Adam lands us in the grave. Our connection with the second Adam, the Lord from heaven, raises us from the grave to inherit the things promised. How important then to be in Christ. God is the offended party; it is his prerogative to prescribe the means through which we may be reinstated in his favor. This is reasonable and just. Let us come then to the word, with a childlike disposition, and learn the things God has revealed for faith and obedience, laying aside all our prepossessions which are not in strict accordance with the testimony. To know that eternal life is only to be had by being in the Christ, is an important and glorious truth. Is it not equally important to know the way by the which we get into Christ? The Bible is as plain on the latter as the former.

All the doctrines of the Bible are in harmony with each other. They are all important and essential. It will not do to exalt one doctrine at the expense of another; but let each have its proper place. Baptism alone will not save; neither will faith, alone. God hath joined them together. It is by works that faith is made perfect. The Gospel, Paul says, is God's power for salvation to every one that believes it. There was something contained in the Gospel, which had been "kept secret, or hid from former ages and generations, but now revealed and made manifest, and by the Scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, made known to all nations for the obedience of faith." This was called a revelation of the mystery, and related to the things concerning the name of Jesus, which comprehends all that is affirmable of Him; and is therefore the summary of his character as a Prophet, Sacrifice, Priest, and King.

The mystery of the Gospel may also be said to contain the conditions of salvation. This, as we have before shown, was made known by Peter on the day of Pentecost, and was connected with immersion into the name of Jesus; which Paul calls the obedience of faith: Rom. i. 5; xvi. 25, 26. Paul says, "By whom (Christ) we have received grace and apostleship

for obedience to the faith, among all nations, for his name. God is now taking out from among the nations, or Gentiles, a people for his name; or a people upon whom his name was to be named; thus making them a part of the one family, which is the royal house. "God hath given him a name which is above every name." "By inheritance He hath obtained a more excellent name than" the angels. This name is like "a strong tower, the righteous run into it and are safe." "There is no other name under heaven given among men, whereby we may be saved."

We are told that "of Him the whole family in heaven and earth is named." Being enlightened with regard to all this, we can understand that as many as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ. Having thus been initiated into the one body, or royal family, they have taken upon them his name. We can see, then, the beauty of the baptismal figure used by Paul, Rom. vi. 4; Col. ii. 12, "Being buried in the likeness of his death:" thus dying to the world and its beggarly elements, and being made alive in the Christ, so walking in newness of life; having obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine delivered to us. Have we all thus obeyed? Have we all, like Jesus, fulfilled all righteousness? We are living in an important age of the world's history. It becomes us to examine ourselves, whether we be in the faith, by the sure touchstone of God's word, which word is to judge us at the last day.

There may be objections in the minds of some concerning the essentiality of baptism, because of those who do not walk worthy. There were many such in the apostle's days, who made shipwreck of faith, and returned, like the sow that was washed, to her wallowing in the mire, and had forgotten that they had once been purged from their sins. This does not militate against the truth. If such instances as these existed in the days of the inspired apostles, can we wonder they exist in our day? Others have been baptised who have not been proper subjects for the ordinance. Simon, the sorcerer, was one such, who, after he was baptized, was still in the gall of bitterness, and in the bonds of iniquity. The bath of water sanctifies and cleanses no one apart from the one faith; neither is it by virtue of anything infused into the water, but because of the association of the name of the Lord with immersion in water. Peter commanded the household of Cornelius to be baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. Hence having the indispensable pre-requisite of a scriptural faith, when washed, they were also sanctified and justified by the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of God. They were saved by baptism, in the sense in which Peter uses the words. Baptism without faith is of no more use than faith without baptism. What, therefore, God hath joined together let no man put asunder. Though Paul had seen, and spoken with Jesus, and believed, he was still in his sins until the moment he obeyed the message of the Lord by Ananias, "Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling upon the name of the Lord." He obeyed, and carried his sins with him to the laver, and called upon the name, by being baptized into it, and for the sake of that name he returned with a perfect conscience.

Now what he did himself he prescribed to others. When, therefore, he went to Corinth, he preached the word, and many of the Corinthians hearing, believed and were baptized. When he wrote to them afterwards, he reminded them that some of them had been fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, thieves, covetous, drunkards, revilers, etc., and that such shall not possess the kingdom of God. He also reminds them, by what means they were delivered from the penalty entailed by such horrible offences. Christ, says he, sent me to preach the Gospel to you, which is the power of God. I declared his testimony unto you concerning Jesus Christ. I spoke to you, of the things which God has prepared for them that love him. What you heard you believed and joyfully embraced, waiting for the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ. Hearing and believing ye were washed, sanctified, justified, by the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of God. They were washed by the name and by the Spirit in believing the Gospel, and

being baptized into the name, or in being sanctified and cleansed, by the bath of water with the word. In his letter to the Ephesians, Paul says, "Christ also loved the Church and gave himself for it; that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish." Let us follow Paul from Corinth to Ephesus. —Here he finds certain disciples who had been under the instruction of Apollos, and which had not heard of the Holy Spirit: that is, they had not heard that the Spirit had yet been given, and, therefore, were ignorant of baptism into the name of Jesus, knowing only the baptism of John. After Paul explained the matter to them, they were baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. Here, certainly, was re-baptism. According to their own account, they had before been baptized into John's baptism. It is probable that Apollos was one of the number; for he was on a par with the rest, knowing only the baptism of John.

Now we infer from the connection, that the imperfect knowledge of Apollos and these disciples, consisted in their not understanding what Peter made known on the day of Pentecost; that is, repentance and remission of sins by baptism into the name of Jesus. In other respects, Apollos was an eloquent man, mighty in the Scriptures, and fervent in spirit, and taught diligently the things of the Lord, as far as he knew. Aquilla and Priscilla, (who had learned the truth from Paul), when they heard Apollos preach, saw a defect in his teaching, and took him aside, and taught him the way of the Lord more perfectly.

Are there not some such characters in our day, who need to be thus taught the way of the Lord more perfectly, who nevertheless are eloquent and mighty in the Scriptures? God often chooses the weak things of the world to confound the mighty.

Faith and obedience; how simple. To believe what God says, and do what God commands; and yet how many there are who stumble over its very simplicity; they want to do, and would do, some great thing, if they were commanded to do it. They want to work out a righteousness of their own. Like Naaman, the Syrian, who went to Elisha the prophet to get cured of his leprosy; who, when told to go and wash seven times in Jordan, was wroth and went away, and said, "Behold, I thought he will surely come out to me, and stand and call upon the name of the Lord his God, and strike his hand over the place, and recover the leper. Are not Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel? may I not wash in them and be clean? So he turned and went away in a rage." A sober second thought, however, suggested by his servant, led him to obey, and he went down and dipped himself seven times in Jordan, according to the saying of the man of God: and he was clean. The case of the blind man, in the days of our Saviour, is also to the point. After Jesus had anointed his eyes with clay, he told him to go to the pool of Siloam, and wash: he obeyed, and went and washed, and came seeing. "Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice."

In the days of the apostles, they acted on the subject of baptism as though their salvation depended upon it. They did not call in question its essentiality. They understood its design, and went forward in its observance with glad hearts, and, like the eunuch, went on their way rejoicing. It is true the record does not say, He that believeth not and is not baptized, shall be condemned. This latter clause, were it inserted in the passage, would be superfluous. Its very omission only proves the necessity of faith as a pre-requisite. The Bible recognizes no baptism without faith. Let us seek a strict conformity to the word of truth, though it should lead us to suffer reproach for the name of Christ. The disciples must certainly have understood Jesus on this subject. He had opened their understandings just before giving them this last command—to teach and baptize—and their subsequent acts make the matter too plain

to need controversy. This subject should have an impartial examination: its importance demands it. There are many who think very little about the matter, and, of course, act accordingly: —they are well acquainted with other subjects, but this is treated by them with indifference. They are guided by their feelings instead of being guided by the word.

I am glad to see attention awakened on the subject, and hope it will result in good. I have given these few thoughts for the sake of the truth. If I am wrong in my conclusions, it remains yet to be shown. With regard to the Spirit, I think the best way to get that is to mind the Spirit's teachings. We may be filled with the Spirit, by having the words of Christ dwelling in us richly, for the words that I speak, says Jesus, "they are spirit and they are life." We may walk in the Spirit by taking that word (which God hath magnified above all His name) as a lamp to our feet and a light to our path: and in so doing we shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. We may sow to the Spirit, by walking in the commandments and ordinances of the Lord, and of the Spirit reap life everlasting.
